Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
Shark and Ninja are real household brands that have taken share by shipping a stream of mid-priced appliances into 40 sub-categories. That is a brand-and-innovation engine, not a repurchase lock-in. Q2 net sales split Shark 45.8% / Ninja 54.2%. The 10-K names Amazon, Costco, and Walmart as the three retailers above 10% of FY25 sales (45.7% combined; largest customer 23.8%). Q2 Customer A was 26.5%. No filing discloses a DTC mix or a consumables/accessories mix, so filters and attachments cannot be scored as a razor-blade moat. Closest covered consumer brands: LULU moat 51, NKE moat 54 — brand without lock-in usually fails the 70 moat bar. SN computes 41.
SharkNinja's durability is brand recognition plus a SKU-innovation cadence, not switching costs. The live question is whether Shark/Ninja is a repurchase brand or a SKU Amazon, Dyson, Bissell, or private label can swap:
- Two Brands, Four Disclosed Categories — Not a System of Record: The 10-Q discloses four product categories and two brands, not a locked-in installed base. Q2: Cleaning $522.0M (29.5%, +4.1%), Cooking and Beverage $499.0M (28.3%, +36.5% on Ninja Luxe Café and Crispi), Food Preparation $458.6M (26.0%, +13.3% on blending), Beauty and Home Environment $285.8M (16.2%, +65.3% on skincare and fans). Shark $807.8M / Ninja $957.6M. A household can replace a Shark vacuum with a Dyson or Bissell, or a Ninja blender with a private-label SKU, without migrating data, recertifying a workflow, or breaking a subscription. That is the opposite of Okta's directory or Salesforce's CRM record.
- Retail Concentration Is the Distribution Fact, Not a Moat: FY25 10-K: largest customer 23.8% of net sales; Amazon, Costco, and Walmart each >10% and 45.7% together; 36 US retailers and 180+ globally; Amazon Global Vendor Management participant. Q2 10-Q: Customer A 26.5% of net sales (21.9% of receivables), Customer B 11.5%, Customer C under 10% in the quarter. DTC is named as a channel (websites and social) with no mix disclosed — do not invent one. Retailers that already concentrate a quarter of sales can reallocate shelf or digital placement. Being easy to merchandise is a growth tactic, not lock-in.
- Consumables and Accessories Are Unmeasured: Vacuums take filters and brush rolls; blenders and espresso machines take attachments and accessories. The 10-K and 10-Q do not break out consumables, replacement parts, or attachment attach-rate as a percent of net sales. CEO commentary on the Q2 call that the core is 'often underestimated' is color, not a repurchase metric. Until a filing prints a durable aftermarket mix, the repurchase-brand claim stays unproven and cannot raise transactionEmbedding above weakened.
Moat Verdict
SharkNinja is a fast-growing consumer-appliance brand whose AI-era exposure is mostly marketing and design efficiency, not a threatened or strengthened system of record. The Q2 beat (sales +22.2%, FY26 raised to +16–17%) does not change any equityMoats status and does not retire Amazon/Costco/Walmart concentration or SKU substitutability. Resilient pillars that apply are two weakened boxes (proprietaryData, transactionEmbedding) totaling weight 22 — below the 36 thin-coverage full-slate line, and the raw resilient score is 35 so the floor does not lift it toward intact 65. Vulnerable intact talent and bundling cannot outvote that 80/20. Computed moat 41 vs LULU 51 and NKE 54: those two stretched community or Nike+ into the resilient book; this card will not. Brand without lock-in fails the 70 moat bar. Coverage only — not a hire.
43.7 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 48.0 · = 48
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer appliances, not a learned software interface. Some products have companion apps; no filing treats app lock-in as material revenue or switching cost.
No enterprise workflow, provisioning rules, or customer-specific business logic. A vacuum or blender is replaced, not migrated.
N/A. Advantage, if any, is brand and SKU design, not access to public datasets.
Product-design and engineering talent that has shipped Luxe Café, Crispi, carpet extractors, and a 40-sub-category cadence is real — the same class of bench LULU and NKE get credit for. It is not scarce the way a foundry process team is scarce, and it does not lock a customer in.
Shark floorcare plus Ninja kitchen plus Beauty/Home across 40 sub-categories is real catalog breadth and some accessory cross-sell (cups, attachments). It is category bundling, not Office-365 lock-in: a retailer or a household can buy one SKU. Same intact treatment as LULU apparel+accessories and NKE footwear+apparel — not a status upgrade because they launched more SKUs.
The 10-K describes a proprietary shelf-and-inventory tracking process and consumer-insight work that feeds the next SKU. That is operational data, not a Nike+-scale membership graph or a dataset a customer would lose by switching. LULU's loyalty file is the analog (weakened); NKE's Nike+ intact claim is a stretch SN does not earn on disclosed facts.
Household appliances. UL/safety and tariff codes are table stakes, not a switching barrier. The IEEPA refund is a COS item, not lock-in.
Consumer brand, not a network. More households owning a Shark does not make the next Shark more valuable. LULU's community-programming intact is a stretch this card will not copy; NKE correctly marked this na. Influencer and 5-star-review marketing is distribution, not a two-sided effect.
No subscription. Filters, bags, brush rolls, and blender cups exist in the catalog, but no 10-K or 10-Q line prints consumables or attach as a percent of net sales. Embedment is brand habit and a warranty, not technical lock-in — same weakened status as LULU and NKE.
N/A. There is no authoritative record a household or a retailer must migrate.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Shark and Ninja are recognised mid-premium appliance brands that win shelf space on product cadence, but SKUs are substitutable and retailers carry rival brands next to them.
Moat in 5–10 years
SharkNinja's moat holds at its current level. The brand, the category bundle and the design bench are intact on a fast product cadence, but the SKUs stay substitutable and retailers stock rivals beside them, so nothing argues for a step up. No named rival is taking a measured share of floorcare or kitchen, so nothing argues for a step down either.
No moat trending · 48 holds
Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
Shark and Ninja are real household brands that have taken share by shipping a stream of mid-priced appliances into 40 sub-categories. That is a brand-and-innovation engine, not a repurchase lock-in. Q2 net sales split Shark 45.8% / Ninja 54.2%. The 10-K names Amazon, Costco, and Walmart as the three retailers above 10% of FY25 sales (45.7% combined; largest customer 23.8%). Q2 Customer A was 26.5%. No filing discloses a DTC mix or a consumables/accessories mix, so filters and attachments cannot be scored as a razor-blade moat. Closest covered consumer brands: LULU moat 51, NKE moat 54 — brand without lock-in usually fails the 70 moat bar. SN computes 41.
Growth Score
Q2 2026 (quarter ended June 30, reported Aug 5) printed net sales $1,765.5M, +22.2% YoY from $1,444.9M (+21.6% constant currency) — the company called it the fastest pace since 2024. H1 $3,178.3M, +19.1%. Brand: Shark $807.8M (45.8%) / Ninja $957.6M (54.2%). Geography: Domestic $1,141.9M +15.5% (US 61.5% of company sales); International $623.6M +36.6% (UK 14.5%). Categories: Cleaning +4.1% to $522.0M (carpet extractors and cordless); Cooking and Beverage +36.5% to $499.0M (Luxe Café, Crispi); Food Preparation +13.3% to $458.6M (blending); Beauty and Home Environment +65.3% to $285.8M (skincare, fans). GAAP GM 48.7% vs 49.0% (−30 bps); Adj. GM 48.7% vs 49.4% (−70 bps) on US tariffs, FX, and retailer activations. GAAP operating income $179.4M (10.1%) vs $168.6M (11.6%); Adj. operating income $231.5M (13.1%) vs $193.5M (13.4%). GAAP diluted EPS $0.92 vs $0.98; Adj. EPS $1.26 vs $0.97. Adj. EBITDA $264.9M (15.0%) vs $223.4M (15.5%). H1 CFO $275.5M vs −$63.9M; H1 capex $83.1M. Cash $779.8M; term loan principal $718.9M; revolver undrawn ($489.8M available). H1 buybacks 1,008,368 shares / $119.7M under the $750M Feb 11 authorization ($630.3M remaining). FY26 raised to net sales +16.0–17.0% (from +11.5–12.5%), Adj. EPS $6.45–$6.55 (from $6.00–$6.10; ~$0.15 of the $0.45 raise is the expected net tariff-refund benefit), Adj. EBITDA $1,357–$1,369M (~$30M of the raise is the same refund), GAAP ETR ~22–23%, diluted WAS ~142.5M, capex $190–210M. Q3 will recognize a $247.1M CBP-accepted IEEPA duty refund as a reduction of cost of sales; the 2025 half is excluded from FY26 adjusted metrics. Do not mark the franchise up because they beat-and-raised.
Valuation Score
Regular-session close $191.23 on Friday Aug 28, 2026 (Yahoo Finance chart API + quote page; 4:00:02 p.m. ET; after-hours $193.34 is not the tape). Yahoo market-cap field $27.063B. 10-Q ordinary shares outstanding 140,871,552 as of July 30, 2026 (140,871,552 × $191.23 = $26.94B); do not invent a share count — header uses the Yahoo field, tilde-rounded ~$27.1B. FY26 diluted WAS guided ~142.5M. Ladder $60 / $130 / $210. At $191.23 the stock is 76.5% of the way from base to bull (1.2× bull = $252) — piecewise 50. Forward ~29× on the company's $6.45–$6.55 FY26 Adj. EPS guide (~30× on ~$6.35 ex the ~$0.15 refund slice). The Aug 5 beat-and-raise does not move the ladder.
The Brand-Without-Lock-In Test
SharkNinja's durability is brand recognition plus a SKU-innovation cadence, not switching costs. The live question is whether Shark/Ninja is a repurchase brand or a SKU Amazon, Dyson, Bissell, or private label can swap:
- Two Brands, Four Disclosed Categories — Not a System of Record: The 10-Q discloses four product categories and two brands, not a locked-in installed base. Q2: Cleaning $522.0M (29.5%, +4.1%), Cooking and Beverage $499.0M (28.3%, +36.5% on Ninja Luxe Café and Crispi), Food Preparation $458.6M (26.0%, +13.3% on blending), Beauty and Home Environment $285.8M (16.2%, +65.3% on skincare and fans). Shark $807.8M / Ninja $957.6M. A household can replace a Shark vacuum with a Dyson or Bissell, or a Ninja blender with a private-label SKU, without migrating data, recertifying a workflow, or breaking a subscription. That is the opposite of Okta's directory or Salesforce's CRM record.
- Retail Concentration Is the Distribution Fact, Not a Moat: FY25 10-K: largest customer 23.8% of net sales; Amazon, Costco, and Walmart each >10% and 45.7% together; 36 US retailers and 180+ globally; Amazon Global Vendor Management participant. Q2 10-Q: Customer A 26.5% of net sales (21.9% of receivables), Customer B 11.5%, Customer C under 10% in the quarter. DTC is named as a channel (websites and social) with no mix disclosed — do not invent one. Retailers that already concentrate a quarter of sales can reallocate shelf or digital placement. Being easy to merchandise is a growth tactic, not lock-in.
- Consumables and Accessories Are Unmeasured: Vacuums take filters and brush rolls; blenders and espresso machines take attachments and accessories. The 10-K and 10-Q do not break out consumables, replacement parts, or attachment attach-rate as a percent of net sales. CEO commentary on the Q2 call that the core is 'often underestimated' is color, not a repurchase metric. Until a filing prints a durable aftermarket mix, the repurchase-brand claim stays unproven and cannot raise transactionEmbedding above weakened.
Moat Verdict
SharkNinja is a fast-growing consumer-appliance brand whose AI-era exposure is mostly marketing and design efficiency, not a threatened or strengthened system of record. The Q2 beat (sales +22.2%, FY26 raised to +16–17%) does not change any equityMoats status and does not retire Amazon/Costco/Walmart concentration or SKU substitutability. Resilient pillars that apply are two weakened boxes (proprietaryData, transactionEmbedding) totaling weight 22 — below the 36 thin-coverage full-slate line, and the raw resilient score is 35 so the floor does not lift it toward intact 65. Vulnerable intact talent and bundling cannot outvote that 80/20. Computed moat 41 vs LULU 51 and NKE 54: those two stretched community or Nike+ into the resilient book; this card will not. Brand without lock-in fails the 70 moat bar. Coverage only — not a hire.
43.7 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 48.0 · = 48
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer appliances, not a learned software interface. Some products have companion apps; no filing treats app lock-in as material revenue or switching cost.
No enterprise workflow, provisioning rules, or customer-specific business logic. A vacuum or blender is replaced, not migrated.
N/A. Advantage, if any, is brand and SKU design, not access to public datasets.
Product-design and engineering talent that has shipped Luxe Café, Crispi, carpet extractors, and a 40-sub-category cadence is real — the same class of bench LULU and NKE get credit for. It is not scarce the way a foundry process team is scarce, and it does not lock a customer in.
Shark floorcare plus Ninja kitchen plus Beauty/Home across 40 sub-categories is real catalog breadth and some accessory cross-sell (cups, attachments). It is category bundling, not Office-365 lock-in: a retailer or a household can buy one SKU. Same intact treatment as LULU apparel+accessories and NKE footwear+apparel — not a status upgrade because they launched more SKUs.
The 10-K describes a proprietary shelf-and-inventory tracking process and consumer-insight work that feeds the next SKU. That is operational data, not a Nike+-scale membership graph or a dataset a customer would lose by switching. LULU's loyalty file is the analog (weakened); NKE's Nike+ intact claim is a stretch SN does not earn on disclosed facts.
Household appliances. UL/safety and tariff codes are table stakes, not a switching barrier. The IEEPA refund is a COS item, not lock-in.
Consumer brand, not a network. More households owning a Shark does not make the next Shark more valuable. LULU's community-programming intact is a stretch this card will not copy; NKE correctly marked this na. Influencer and 5-star-review marketing is distribution, not a two-sided effect.
No subscription. Filters, bags, brush rolls, and blender cups exist in the catalog, but no 10-K or 10-Q line prints consumables or attach as a percent of net sales. Embedment is brand habit and a warranty, not technical lock-in — same weakened status as LULU and NKE.
N/A. There is no authoritative record a household or a retailer must migrate.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Shark and Ninja are recognised mid-premium appliance brands that win shelf space on product cadence, but SKUs are substitutable and retailers carry rival brands next to them.
Moat in 5–10 years
SharkNinja's moat holds at its current level. The brand, the category bundle and the design bench are intact on a fast product cadence, but the SKUs stay substitutable and retailers stock rivals beside them, so nothing argues for a step up. No named rival is taking a measured share of floorcare or kitchen, so nothing argues for a step down either.
No moat trending · 48 holds
Growth Analysis
Growth Drivers
Key Risk
If FY2026 net sales print below the raised 16.0% floor ($7,423M on FY25 $6,399.2M), or Q3 Cleaning Appliances prints a year-over-year decline, the 'core is durable' claim and the 10–16% CAGR band both break. Residual: Customer A was 26.5% of Q2 sales; Amazon/Costco/Walmart were 45.7% of FY25 — a shelf or digital reset at any of the three is a SKU-swap event this filing cannot retire. ~$0.15 of the $0.45 Adj. EPS raise is the expected net tariff-refund benefit, not operations.
Score Derivation
77.1 base + 1.3 trajectory − 4 margin − 5 risk = 69
Base 77.14 (10–16% CAGR, midpoint 13.0%, baseFromCagr: 70+((13.0−8)/7)×10 = 77.14) + 1.33 trajectory (2 of 3 accelerating: International and new categories; Core Cleaning decelerating) − 4 compressing margins (Q2 GAAP GM −30 bps, Adj. GM −70 bps, Adj. EBITDA margin 15.0% vs 15.5%; do not paper over with the $247.1M Q3 refund) − 5 moderate keyRisk (Amazon/retailer SKU-swap and holiday miss vs the 16% floor remain unmaterialised; Cleaning deceleration and GM compression are already charged above) = 69.47 → 69. primaryType does not score. Do not bump because they beat.
Price Scenarios (12–24 Months)
Price vs Targets
Dashed lines mark the 12–24 month bear, base and bull targets. Daily closes.
Valuation Multiples
| Trailing P/E (GAAP) | ~39× |
| Forward P/E (FY26, adjusted) | ~29× |
| PEG Ratio | ~2.3× |
| Price / Sales (FY26) | ~3.6× |
| FY25 FCF / H1 FCF | $474M / $184M |
Post-print tape $191.23 (Aug 28 close, Yahoo) sits at a 52-week high band of $83.12–$194.53 after the Aug 5 raise. Forward multiple is ~29× on the company's own $6.45–$6.55 FY26 Adj. EPS guide and ~3.6× FY26 sales — a growth-brand multiple for a household-appliance company whose resilient moats are two weakened pillars. Yahoo 1y target est. $209.56 (quote page) is essentially this card's $210 bull. Net cash is thin: cash $779.8M vs term-loan principal $718.9M as of June 30. The innovation cadence and the 16–17% guide can support a premium to slower appliance peers; the margin of safety versus the $130 base is gone. Next test is the FY26 16% sales floor and Q3 Cleaning, not a restated ladder.
Approximate figures as of August 28, 2026.
Where We Are vs Targets
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Innovation cadence slips, Cleaning stays low-single-digit then declines, Amazon/Costco/Walmart reallocate shelf, and the tariff refund proves one-time — growth fades to 4–6% and the multiple compresses to ~12× on a ~$5 trough Adj. EPS.
- FY2026 net sales print below the $7,423M / 16.0% floor, or Q3 Cleaning Appliances prints a YoY decline after Q2 +4.1% and Q4 2025 +3.4%
- Customer A (26.5% of Q2 sales) or the Amazon/Costco/Walmart group (45.7% of FY25) cuts placement; private-label or Dyson/Bissell/Tineco take the floorcare and blending slots the 10-K treats as leadership
- Gross margin compresses through the high-40s on successor tariffs (guide assumes 10% Indonesia/Malaysia/Cambodia and 12.5% China/Vietnam/Thailand for the rest of 2026) and retailer activations; the $247.1M IEEPA refund is Q3 COS, not a run-rate
- Multiple compresses to ~12× on ~$5.00 trough Adj. EPS → ~$60/share
SharkNinja delivers the raised FY2026 guide (sales +16–17%, Adj. EPS $6.45–$6.55 including ~$0.15 refund), then fades toward the 10–16% CAGR band as Cleaning stays low-to-mid single digits and International/Beauty do the lifting — rewarded with a ~20× forward earnings multiple, not a software multiple. Ladder is the execution case; do not mark it up because they beat.
- FY2026 net sales land in the $7,423–$7,487M guide; Cleaning stays positive but mid-single-digit; International holds a 20%+ rate as mix is already 35%
- Adj. EPS prints in the $6.45–$6.55 range; the ~$0.15 refund slice is disclosed, not silently treated as operations. Adj. EBITDA $1,357–$1,369M with ~$30M refund
- Gross margin holds the high-40s after the Q3 refund print; FY26 capex $190–210M; $630.3M remaining on the $750M repurchase authorization is dry powder, not a thesis
- 20× on FY26 midpoint Adj. EPS $6.50 maps to ~$130. Do not mark the target up because the tape is $191
International and new categories keep company growth in the mid-teens through FY2028, Cleaning stabilizes, and the stock holds a ~24× multiple on FY2028 Adj. EPS around $8.75 as the market treats the innovation engine as a durable compounder. Tape already near $210 is not a reason to rewrite this FY2028 scenario.
- International scales past 40% of sales with the UK-direct playbook repeating in more markets; Beauty and Home Environment stays a mid-teens-or-better company-level mix rather than a one-year SKU spike
- A filing finally prints a material, recurring aftermarket/consumables mix — the repurchase-brand claim that this card will not assume
- Cleaning returns to high-single-digit growth on carpet extractors / cordless without giving back share to Dyson/Bissell/private label
- FY2028 Adj. EPS around $8.75 at 24× → ~$210/share. Yahoo 1y target est. $209.56 is this case, not a new fact