Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
The moat is still the athlete roster, the wholesale doors, and a product engine that is working in performance and not in sportswear, Jordan or China. Q1 FY27 cut the year to a high-single-digit revenue decline and launched the $2.5B "Pace" cost programme: the brand is being defended with cost, not yet with demand.
Nike's moat is brand + sports marketing scale + product cadence — intact as a franchise, unproven as a turnaround:
- Brand and Athlete Marketing Footprint: The World Cup is the cleanest recent proof that the marketing machine still works. National-team kits had sold 2.5× the World Cup 2022 pace by the start of the tournament, the new Mercurial was the fastest 24-hour cleated launch in Nike Direct's history, and the football films had 1.5 billion views in the first week. That is brand reach. It is not yet a company growth rate: global football and running are carrying performance, while sportswear and Jordan streetwear — about half of revenue — are still in decline.
- Wholesale Rebuild, Direct Shrink: Hill's reversal of the DTC over-pivot is showing up in the channel mix and not in the total. FY26 wholesale was $27.5B, +6% reported and +4% currency-neutral, with North America wholesale +10% in Q4 and a positive Foot Locker comp for the first time in four years. NIKE Direct was $17.7B, −6% reported and −8% currency-neutral, and Q4 Direct was −9% currency-neutral. The traffic flywheel is being rebuilt through partners. Nike-owned digital and stores are still shrinking.
- Running Works; Sportswear Does Not: Running has now put up five consecutive double-digit quarters and added about $1B over that stretch. In FY26 Nike gained 5 points of statement-footwear running share in North America and Western Europe, more than any other top-five brand, and classic footwear franchises were cut by more than $2B. The other half of the business did not follow. Sportswear was down double digits in Q4, Jordan Brand finished the year at $7.0B (−3% reported, −5% currency-neutral), and management expects both sportswear and Jordan streetwear to stay negative through FY27, with improvement only in the back half. Spring 2027 is the first season of sport-offense product taken from brief to market. That is the swing factor, and it is not in the FY26 numbers.
Moat Verdict
AI does not move this moat. Marketing gets cheaper to produce, and design tools get faster; neither replaces the athlete contracts or the wholesale doors. The FY26 print split the franchise in two: running and global football are working, sportswear and Greater China are not, and total revenue was flat. Q1 FY27 deepened the split: performance grew high single digits while China fell 26%. At ~$37 the stock is ~30× the $1.15–1.35 FY27 guide midpoint — priced for a recovery in FY28, not for the stall it is in.
55.3 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 57.3 · = 57
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer brand, not a learned interface.
Not a software-logic business.
No controlled public dataset.
Athlete relationships, design, and sport-marketing talent at this scale are still scarce. The sport offense moved about 8,000 people into sport verticals in FY26; Shai Gilgeous-Alexander moved from Converse onto Nike basketball. The bench did not get thinner.
Footwear, apparel, and Jordan still cross-sell in a way a single-category rival does not. The bundle is intact. The part that is failing — sportswear and Jordan streetwear, about half of revenue — is a demand problem inside the bundle, not the bundle disappearing.
Nike Direct still holds first-party member and purchase data, but Direct was −8% currency-neutral in FY26 and is a shrinking share of the mix as wholesale is rebuilt. The dataset is real and no longer getting more central.
No license, certification, or procurement moat.
A consumer brand, not a network. Athlete visibility is marketing scale, not a network effect.
No material subscription. What repeats is brand habit and a wholesale reorder, and both are being re-earned season by season. That is not a payment rail or a system a retailer cannot leave.
Not a system of record. Being the default shoe in a sport is a brand position, not an authoritative ledger.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Still the largest sportswear brand with athlete and wholesale reach, but On, Hoka and adidas have taken share and Nike has had to discount; the premium is being re-earned season by season.
Moat in 5–10 years
Nike's moat holds at its current level. The share taken by On, Hoka and adidas has already happened and is in the brand and embedding statuses, and the ~$16B performance business growing high single digits (running double-digit) shows the athlete and wholesale engine still works. Q1 FY27's China (−26%) and Converse (−28%) declines are a demand and inventory reset inside an intact brand rather than a named rival moving a pillar, so no trend is called until the November Investor Day plan shows up in sportswear, Jordan and China.
No moat trending · 57 holds
Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
The moat is still the athlete roster, the wholesale doors, and a product engine that is working in performance and not in sportswear, Jordan or China. Q1 FY27 cut the year to a high-single-digit revenue decline and launched the $2.5B "Pace" cost programme: the brand is being defended with cost, not yet with demand.
Growth Score
Q1 FY27 (quarter ended August 31, reported October 1): revenue $11.2B, −4% reported and −5% currency-neutral; diluted EPS $0.48. Gross margin rose 60bps to 42.8% on lower warehousing and logistics costs. NIKE Direct fell 9% currency-neutral (Digital −13%, owned stores −5%), Greater China −26% and Converse −28%. The roughly $16B performance business grew high single digits, with running double-digit, but management said it is "not yet large enough to offset" sportswear, Jordan and China. Full-year FY27 revenue is now guided down high single digits, with adjusted EPS of $1.15–1.35 excluding about $0.15 of costs from "Pace", a multiyear programme targeting $2.5B of savings with layoffs from 2027. That is well below the ~$1.70 FY27 EPS the Street carried in September. Investor Day is November 16–17.
Valuation Score
At the $37.14 close on October 15, 2026 (a 5% bounce that day), Nike sits ~9% above a base re-struck to $34 and 13% of the way from it toward the $57 bull, a 62 on the piecewise scale. The ladder comes down from $27 / $44 / $68 because the Q1 FY27 guide took FY27 adjusted EPS to $1.15–1.35, against the ~$1.70 the September base was written on: at $37.14 the stock is ~30× the guide midpoint. The new base is ~19× a ~$1.75 FY28 (this file's assumption) if Pace savings reach EBIT, and sits inside the post-print target range ($24–$33 from BofA, Goldman, Citi and Deutsche Bank) near its top. At the old ladder the same price would have scored 75; the gap is the lower ladder, not a richer price.
The Iconic Brand Moat
Nike's moat is brand + sports marketing scale + product cadence — intact as a franchise, unproven as a turnaround:
- Brand and Athlete Marketing Footprint: The World Cup is the cleanest recent proof that the marketing machine still works. National-team kits had sold 2.5× the World Cup 2022 pace by the start of the tournament, the new Mercurial was the fastest 24-hour cleated launch in Nike Direct's history, and the football films had 1.5 billion views in the first week. That is brand reach. It is not yet a company growth rate: global football and running are carrying performance, while sportswear and Jordan streetwear — about half of revenue — are still in decline.
- Wholesale Rebuild, Direct Shrink: Hill's reversal of the DTC over-pivot is showing up in the channel mix and not in the total. FY26 wholesale was $27.5B, +6% reported and +4% currency-neutral, with North America wholesale +10% in Q4 and a positive Foot Locker comp for the first time in four years. NIKE Direct was $17.7B, −6% reported and −8% currency-neutral, and Q4 Direct was −9% currency-neutral. The traffic flywheel is being rebuilt through partners. Nike-owned digital and stores are still shrinking.
- Running Works; Sportswear Does Not: Running has now put up five consecutive double-digit quarters and added about $1B over that stretch. In FY26 Nike gained 5 points of statement-footwear running share in North America and Western Europe, more than any other top-five brand, and classic footwear franchises were cut by more than $2B. The other half of the business did not follow. Sportswear was down double digits in Q4, Jordan Brand finished the year at $7.0B (−3% reported, −5% currency-neutral), and management expects both sportswear and Jordan streetwear to stay negative through FY27, with improvement only in the back half. Spring 2027 is the first season of sport-offense product taken from brief to market. That is the swing factor, and it is not in the FY26 numbers.
Moat Verdict
AI does not move this moat. Marketing gets cheaper to produce, and design tools get faster; neither replaces the athlete contracts or the wholesale doors. The FY26 print split the franchise in two: running and global football are working, sportswear and Greater China are not, and total revenue was flat. Q1 FY27 deepened the split: performance grew high single digits while China fell 26%. At ~$37 the stock is ~30× the $1.15–1.35 FY27 guide midpoint — priced for a recovery in FY28, not for the stall it is in.
55.3 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 57.3 · = 57
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer brand, not a learned interface.
Not a software-logic business.
No controlled public dataset.
Athlete relationships, design, and sport-marketing talent at this scale are still scarce. The sport offense moved about 8,000 people into sport verticals in FY26; Shai Gilgeous-Alexander moved from Converse onto Nike basketball. The bench did not get thinner.
Footwear, apparel, and Jordan still cross-sell in a way a single-category rival does not. The bundle is intact. The part that is failing — sportswear and Jordan streetwear, about half of revenue — is a demand problem inside the bundle, not the bundle disappearing.
Nike Direct still holds first-party member and purchase data, but Direct was −8% currency-neutral in FY26 and is a shrinking share of the mix as wholesale is rebuilt. The dataset is real and no longer getting more central.
No license, certification, or procurement moat.
A consumer brand, not a network. Athlete visibility is marketing scale, not a network effect.
No material subscription. What repeats is brand habit and a wholesale reorder, and both are being re-earned season by season. That is not a payment rail or a system a retailer cannot leave.
Not a system of record. Being the default shoe in a sport is a brand position, not an authoritative ledger.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Still the largest sportswear brand with athlete and wholesale reach, but On, Hoka and adidas have taken share and Nike has had to discount; the premium is being re-earned season by season.
Moat in 5–10 years
Nike's moat holds at its current level. The share taken by On, Hoka and adidas has already happened and is in the brand and embedding statuses, and the ~$16B performance business growing high single digits (running double-digit) shows the athlete and wholesale engine still works. Q1 FY27's China (−26%) and Converse (−28%) declines are a demand and inventory reset inside an intact brand rather than a named rival moving a pillar, so no trend is called until the November Investor Day plan shows up in sportswear, Jordan and China.
No moat trending · 57 holds
Growth Analysis
Growth Drivers
Key Risk
If Greater China keeps falling at the Q1 rate (−26%) and sportswear plus Jordan are still declining after the November Investor Day plan, FY27 revenue lands below the high-single-digit guided decline and FY28 does not recover; the −1% to 2% band then breaks toward a second year of mid-single-digit declines.
Score Derivation
51.3 base − 1.3 trajectory − 4 margin − 5 risk = 41
Base 51.3 (−1% to 2% CAGR, midpoint 0.5%, after the FY27 guide cut to a high-single-digit decline) − 1.3 trajectory (performance accelerating; China and sportswear/Jordan decelerating) − 4 compressing margin (FY27 EBIT guided down more than revenue despite +60bps Q1 gross margin) − 5 moderate residual risk (China and sportswear falling past the guide) = 41. The China and sportswear risk the September file carried has materialised and is now charged in the CAGR, not left in severity.
Price Scenarios (12–24 Months)
Price vs Targets
Dashed lines mark the 12–24 month bear, base and bull targets. Daily closes.
Valuation Analysis
Base of ~$34 is ~19× a ~$1.75 FY28 EPS that assumes Pace savings reach EBIT and revenue stabilises after the FY27 decline; the stock is ~30× the FY27 adjusted guide midpoint today. The dividend ($1.64 a year) exceeds the FY27 guide, so capital return is no longer a support. ~$34.
Valuation Multiples
| Trailing P/E (GAAP) | ~18× |
| Forward P/E (FY27 guide) | ~30× |
| Price / Sales (FY27E) | ~1.3× |
| Dividend Yield | ~4.4% |
On the FY27 guide Nike is a ~30× stock on trough earnings with a dividend it does not cover. The price only looks cheap against FY26 earnings that included a one-time tariff recovery; what it needs is evidence at the November Investor Day that Pace savings reach EBIT.
Approximate figures as of October 16, 2026 (price $37.14).
Where We Are vs Targets
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Pace savings are reinvested in price and marketing, China keeps falling at the Q1 rate and FY28 EPS stays near $1.30. About 18× that is $24, the BofA target, and the dividend is cut.
- FY27 revenue lands at the bottom of the high-single-digit decline, with Greater China down 20%+ for the year
- Sportswear and Jordan are still negative after the November Investor Day
- Dividend cut to bring the payout under earnings
Twelve-to-twenty-four month fair value if FY27 is the trough: revenue declines high single digits as guided, Pace savings start reaching EBIT in FY28, and FY28 EPS around $1.75 (this file's assumption, not a company or consensus figure) supports about 19×, slightly under the old base's 20×. That is $34. It replaces the $44 base, which needed FY28 EPS of $2.20.
- FY27 lands inside the $1.15–1.35 adjusted EPS guide
- Performance keeps growing high single digits and offsets more of sportswear by FY28
- FY28 EPS near $1.75 at ~19×, with the $0.41 dividend held
The spring 2027 sport-offense cycle and the World Cup halo pull sportswear back to growth, China stabilises after the reset, and Pace delivers most of its $2.5B, taking FY28 EPS near $2.30 at ~25×.
- Sportswear and Jordan turn positive in H2 FY27 or early FY28
- Greater China returns to growth once the marketplace cleanup is done
- FY28 EPS near $2.30 and the multiple moves to the mid-20s
NKE: common questions
Is Nike stock a buy?
We rate Nike Avoid, with a composite score of 49/100: moat 57, growth 41 and valuation 62. The valuation score is struck against our bear, base and bull targets and moves with the price.
What is Nike's moat?
Nike scores 57/100 on moat. The moat is still the athlete roster, the wholesale doors, and a product engine that is working in performance and not in sportswear, Jordan or China.
How fast is Nike expected to grow?
We estimate -1–2% a year over the next three to five years, for a growth score of 41/100.
What is Nike's price target?
Our base case is $34, with $24 in the bear case and $57 in the bull case.