Nike
Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
The moat is still the athlete roster, the wholesale doors, and a product engine that is working in running and not yet in sportswear. FY26 kept revenue flat and did not deliver the inflection the May write-up was waiting on.
Nike's moat is brand + sports marketing scale + product cadence — intact as a franchise, unproven as a turnaround:
- Brand and Athlete Marketing Footprint: The World Cup is the cleanest recent proof that the marketing machine still works. National-team kits had sold 2.5× the World Cup 2022 pace by the start of the tournament, the new Mercurial was the fastest 24-hour cleated launch in Nike Direct's history, and the football films had 1.5 billion views in the first week. That is brand reach. It is not yet a company growth rate: global football and running are carrying performance, while sportswear and Jordan streetwear — about half of revenue — are still in decline.
- Wholesale Rebuild, Direct Shrink: Hill's reversal of the DTC over-pivot is showing up in the channel mix and not in the total. FY26 wholesale was $27.5B, +6% reported and +4% currency-neutral, with North America wholesale +10% in Q4 and a positive Foot Locker comp for the first time in four years. NIKE Direct was $17.7B, −6% reported and −8% currency-neutral, and Q4 Direct was −9% currency-neutral. The traffic flywheel is being rebuilt through partners. Nike-owned digital and stores are still shrinking.
- Running Works; Sportswear Does Not: Running has now put up five consecutive double-digit quarters and added about $1B over that stretch. In FY26 Nike gained 5 points of statement-footwear running share in North America and Western Europe, more than any other top-five brand, and classic footwear franchises were cut by more than $2B. The other half of the business did not follow. Sportswear was down double digits in Q4, Jordan Brand finished the year at $7.0B (−3% reported, −5% currency-neutral), and management expects both sportswear and Jordan streetwear to stay negative through FY27, with improvement only in the back half. Spring 2027 is the first season of sport-offense product taken from brief to market. That is the swing factor, and it is not in the FY26 numbers.
Moat Verdict
AI does not move this moat. Marketing gets cheaper to produce, and design tools get faster; neither replaces the athlete contracts or the wholesale doors. The FY26 print split the franchise in two: running and global football are working, sportswear and Greater China are not, and total revenue was flat. At $36 the stock is priced for that stall — about 21× a ~$1.70 FY27 earnings year — not for the $4 recovery the prior file assumed.
55.3 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 57.3 · = 57
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer brand, not a learned interface.
Not a software-logic business.
No controlled public dataset.
Athlete relationships, design, and sport-marketing talent at this scale are still scarce. The sport offense moved about 8,000 people into sport verticals in FY26; Shai Gilgeous-Alexander moved from Converse onto Nike basketball. The bench did not get thinner.
Footwear, apparel, and Jordan still cross-sell in a way a single-category rival does not. The bundle is intact. The part that is failing — sportswear and Jordan streetwear, about half of revenue — is a demand problem inside the bundle, not the bundle disappearing.
Nike Direct still holds first-party member and purchase data, but Direct was −8% currency-neutral in FY26 and is a shrinking share of the mix as wholesale is rebuilt. The dataset is real and no longer getting more central.
No license, certification, or procurement moat.
A consumer brand, not a network. Athlete visibility is marketing scale, not a network effect.
No material subscription. What repeats is brand habit and a wholesale reorder, and both are being re-earned season by season. That is not a payment rail or a system a retailer cannot leave.
Not a system of record. Being the default shoe in a sport is a brand position, not an authoritative ledger.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Still the largest sportswear brand with athlete and wholesale reach, but On, Hoka and adidas have taken share and Nike has had to discount; the premium is being re-earned season by season.
Combined average of Moat (AI Resilience), Growth, and Valuation scores.
Moat Score
The moat is still the athlete roster, the wholesale doors, and a product engine that is working in running and not yet in sportswear. FY26 kept revenue flat and did not deliver the inflection the May write-up was waiting on.
Growth Score
FY26 revenue was $46.4B, flat reported and −2% currency-neutral. Q4 was $11.0B, −1% reported and −4% currency-neutral, with North America +3%, EMEA −6%, and Greater China −12% reported / −17% currency-neutral. Q1 FY27 is guided down low-to-mid single digits, with no FX help, and the three-quarter window through Q2 FY27 was revised from down low-single digits to down low-to-mid single digits. Earnings over that window are still described as flattish, excluding the tariff recovery. Q1 reports October 1. Investor Day is November 16–17. CFO Matthew Friend is leaving; the June 30 call did not name a successor.
Valuation Score
At ~$36.10 Nike is sitting on a 52-week low ($35.35; the high was $76.97) and about 18% under the $44 base. The May file had this at ~$42 and ~13× a ~$3.30 FY26 EPS, with FY27 earnings recovering through $4. FY26 diluted EPS was $2.10, and $1.58 once the $0.52 Q4 tariff-recovery benefit is removed. On a street FY27 EPS near $1.71 the stock is about 21× — a discount to the pre-reset multiple, not a 10× failed-brand stub.
The Iconic Brand Moat
Nike's moat is brand + sports marketing scale + product cadence — intact as a franchise, unproven as a turnaround:
- Brand and Athlete Marketing Footprint: The World Cup is the cleanest recent proof that the marketing machine still works. National-team kits had sold 2.5× the World Cup 2022 pace by the start of the tournament, the new Mercurial was the fastest 24-hour cleated launch in Nike Direct's history, and the football films had 1.5 billion views in the first week. That is brand reach. It is not yet a company growth rate: global football and running are carrying performance, while sportswear and Jordan streetwear — about half of revenue — are still in decline.
- Wholesale Rebuild, Direct Shrink: Hill's reversal of the DTC over-pivot is showing up in the channel mix and not in the total. FY26 wholesale was $27.5B, +6% reported and +4% currency-neutral, with North America wholesale +10% in Q4 and a positive Foot Locker comp for the first time in four years. NIKE Direct was $17.7B, −6% reported and −8% currency-neutral, and Q4 Direct was −9% currency-neutral. The traffic flywheel is being rebuilt through partners. Nike-owned digital and stores are still shrinking.
- Running Works; Sportswear Does Not: Running has now put up five consecutive double-digit quarters and added about $1B over that stretch. In FY26 Nike gained 5 points of statement-footwear running share in North America and Western Europe, more than any other top-five brand, and classic footwear franchises were cut by more than $2B. The other half of the business did not follow. Sportswear was down double digits in Q4, Jordan Brand finished the year at $7.0B (−3% reported, −5% currency-neutral), and management expects both sportswear and Jordan streetwear to stay negative through FY27, with improvement only in the back half. Spring 2027 is the first season of sport-offense product taken from brief to market. That is the swing factor, and it is not in the FY26 numbers.
Moat Verdict
AI does not move this moat. Marketing gets cheaper to produce, and design tools get faster; neither replaces the athlete contracts or the wholesale doors. The FY26 print split the franchise in two: running and global football are working, sportswear and Greater China are not, and total revenue was flat. At $36 the stock is priced for that stall — about 21× a ~$1.70 FY27 earnings year — not for the $4 recovery the prior file assumed.
55.3 resilient · 65.0 vulnerable · 80/20 = 57.3 · = 57
Open a moat to read its note.
Consumer brand, not a learned interface.
Not a software-logic business.
No controlled public dataset.
Athlete relationships, design, and sport-marketing talent at this scale are still scarce. The sport offense moved about 8,000 people into sport verticals in FY26; Shai Gilgeous-Alexander moved from Converse onto Nike basketball. The bench did not get thinner.
Footwear, apparel, and Jordan still cross-sell in a way a single-category rival does not. The bundle is intact. The part that is failing — sportswear and Jordan streetwear, about half of revenue — is a demand problem inside the bundle, not the bundle disappearing.
Nike Direct still holds first-party member and purchase data, but Direct was −8% currency-neutral in FY26 and is a shrinking share of the mix as wholesale is rebuilt. The dataset is real and no longer getting more central.
No license, certification, or procurement moat.
A consumer brand, not a network. Athlete visibility is marketing scale, not a network effect.
No material subscription. What repeats is brand habit and a wholesale reorder, and both are being re-earned season by season. That is not a payment rail or a system a retailer cannot leave.
Not a system of record. Being the default shoe in a sport is a brand position, not an authoritative ledger.
Not a source of durability for this business: no structural unit-cost gap versus rivals that the other pillars do not already capture.
Still the largest sportswear brand with athlete and wholesale reach, but On, Hoka and adidas have taken share and Nike has had to discount; the premium is being re-earned season by season.
Growth Analysis
Growth Drivers
Key Risk
If Greater China stays at the Q4 pace (−12% reported / −17% currency-neutral) through FY27, and sportswear plus Jordan streetwear are still negative in the back half, the 1-4% blend breaks. FY28 earnings then stay near the street's ~$1.70 FY27 EPS instead of rebuilding toward the low $2s.
Score Derivation
56.3 base − 1.3 trajectory − 4 margin − 5 risk = 46
Base 56 (2.5% midpoint of 1-4%) − 1.3 trajectory (running accelerating; China and sportswear/Jordan decelerating) − 4 compressing margin (FY gross margin 40.8% ex the IEEPA recovery) − 5 moderate residual risk = 46
Price Scenarios (12–24 Months)
Valuation Multiples
| Trailing P/E (GAAP) | ~17× |
| Trailing P/E (ex-tariff) | ~23× |
| Forward P/E (FY27) | ~21× |
| Price / Sales (FY26) | ~1.2× |
| Dividend Yield | ~4.5% |
Strip the one-time tariff recovery and Nike is a ~23× stock on trough earnings, with a dividend the clean number does not cover. The discount versus the old high-20s multiple is real. It is a discount for a revenue line that is still guided down, not a free option on a $4 earnings year.
Approximate figures as of September 22, 2026.
Where We Are vs Targets
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The Q1 guide proves too high, China stays double-digit negative, and FY28 EPS never leaves the mid-$1s. About 16× that earnings rate is $27 — a quarter below the current price, not a balance-sheet break. Cash and short-term investments were $9.0B at May 31.
- FY27 revenue finishes down mid-single digits rather than the low end of the Q1 guide
- Greater China does not stabilize; the full-year decline stays double-digit
- Q1 gross-margin expansion does not show up, and ex-tariff margin stays near 40%
Twelve-to-twenty-four month fair value if the reset holds: Q1 lands inside a low-to-mid-single-digit decline, sportswear improves in the back half as guided, and FY28 EPS around $2.20 supports about 20×. That is $44. It is not the old $65 case, which needed FY27 EPS of $4.20.
- Q1 revenue lands inside the down low-to-mid-single-digit guide
- Running and global football keep performance growing, and wholesale stays positive
- FY28 EPS near $2.20 at ~20×, with the $0.41 dividend held
The spring 2027 sport-offense cycle and the World Cup halo pull sportswear back to growth, China stabilizes after the inventory cleanup, and FY28 EPS near $2.80 gets a mid-20s multiple. That is a re-rating on evidence, not a return to the $95 case.
- Sportswear and Jordan streetwear turn positive in H2 FY27, ahead of the 'improvement, still negative' guide
- Greater China returns to growth once the marketplace cleanup is done
- FY28 EPS near $2.80 and the multiple moves back toward the mid-20s